

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT****Routing Slip**

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		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		✓		
2	DDCI		✓		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS		✓		
5	DDI		✓		
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/EE0				
14	D/Pers				
15	D/OEA				
16	C/PAD/OEA				
17	SA/IA				
18	AO/DCI				
19	C/IPD/OIS				
20	NO/SP		✓		
21	C/ACNS		✓		
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SUSPENSE \_\_\_\_\_  
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Remarks:

*[Signature]*  
Executive Secretary

10/14/83  
Date

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Executive Registry

83-4997

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Washington, D.C. 20451

OFFICE OF  
THE DIRECTOR

October 14, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Robert M. Kimmitt,  
Executive Secretary, National Security Council


Charles Hill,  
Executive Secretary, Department of State

Colonel John H. Stanford,  
Executive Secretary, Department of Defense

✓ Thomas B. Cormack  
Executive Secretary, Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: U.S. Initiatives/Soviet Responses

Attached is a chronology of U.S. initiatives in INF and START and Soviet responses to these initiatives. This working paper, prepared by ACDA, is provided for information and use by your Agency. We are also preparing a similar chronology of Soviet initiatives and will forward these to you when completed.

  
William B. Staples  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:  
As stated

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Working Paper

US INITIATIVES IN INFUS InitiativeSoviet Response

1. Agreed Data Base: December 4, 1981, Nitze informally suggests an agreed data base will be necessary to set a starting point for reductions.  
Negative: December 8, 1982, Kvitsinskiy states negotiations could become "enmeshed" in data like MBFR.
2. Zero Proposal: December 11, 1981, Nitze formally presents the concrete elements of the US "zero-zero" proposal.  
Negative: December 15, 1981, Soviet side rejects as one-sided and biased.
3. Data: January 28, 1982, Nitze tables data on US and Soviet INF aircraft and missiles.  
Negative: February 2, 1982, Kvitsinskiy rejects US data; claims approximate equality in "medium-range" systems in Europe and tables supporting Soviet data.
4. Draft Treaty: February 2, 1982, US Delegation tables draft zero Treaty text.  
Negative: March 9, 1982, following informal criticism Kvitsinskiy formally states that US draft Treaty is not a basis for an acceptable agreement.
5. Data Working Group: June 7, 1982, Nitze suggests the establishment of working group on data.  
Positive: Kvitsinskiy agrees. First Working Group meeting convened June 16, 1982.
6. Treaty Text Working Group: June 24, 1982, Nitze proposes establishment of working group to negotiate selected articles of draft Treaty.  
Positive: July 1, 1982, Kvitsinskiy agrees. Treaty Text Working Group meets first on July 6.
7. Missile Destruction Procedures: October 28, 1982, Nitze tables procedures necessary to assure verification of missile destruction.  
Negative: November 18, 1982, Kvitsinskiy states that verification is secondary and must follow resolution of main issues, and that specific measures bear the imprint of the inequitable US approach.

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8. CBMs: Nov. 23, 1982, US formally proposes agreement on advance notification of INF ballistic missile test launches.  
Negative: Nov. 23, 1982, Kvitsinskiy rejects US proposal on the basis it would imply acceptance of P-II deployments.
9. Working Group on Verification: February 1, 1983, Nitze proposes to negotiate destruction procedures.  
Negative: February 1, 1983, Kvitsinskiy sees "no need" for such a working group until agreement is reached on central issues.
10. CBMs: February 1, 1983, Nitze tables draft text of a Treaty on advance notification of LRINF ballistic missile launches and proposes formation of working group.  
Negative: March 17, 1983, Kvitsinskiy states that US draft CBM proposal assumes zero option and is unacceptable.
11. Criteria for an Agreement: February 3, 1983, Nitze sets forth President's five criteria by which US will evaluate acceptability of US Soviet proposals.  
Negative: March 24, 1983, following informal criticism Kvitsinskiy formally rejects criteria as reflective of "zero-zero" position. Insists on four Soviet "prerequisites" for an agreement.
12. Interim Agreement: Mar. 29, 1983, US proposes Interim Agreement which calls for equal levels of US and Soviet LRINF warheads on a global basis.  
Negative: May 19, 1983, When negotiations resume following recess, Kvitsinskiy rejects the interim solution because it entails U.S. deployments and no compensation for third-country systems.
13. Starting Date for Round V: March 28, 1983, Nitze proposes that the sides begin Round V in mid May (i.e. May 17) rather than early June.  
Positive: March 29, 1983, Kvitsinskiy accepts early starting date.

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14. Interim Proposal Treaty: May 19, 1983, Delegation tables draft Treaty based on proposal for Interim Agreement. Negative: July 12, 1983, following informal criticism Kvitsinskiy formally rejects as the "stillborn twin brother" of the Zero Treaty.
15. Specific Warhead Limits: June 16, 1983 Nitze proposes, within 0 and 572 constraints, LRINF missile warhead numbers, in increments of 50, between 50 and 450. Negative: July 12, 1983 Kvitsinskiy says any numerical combination in an "interim solution" is unacceptable.
16. Reciprocal Collateral Constraints: July 12, 1983, US Delegation tables revised Treaty language which applies collateral constraints to US Pershing I. Negative: July 12, 1983, Kvitsinskiy asserts peripheral questions must wait until central issues are resolved.
17. Destruction Working Group: Sept. 13, 1983, Nitze urges formation of working group to discuss destruction measures without prejudice to composition of arms. Positive: Sept. 22, 1983, Delegations agree that the reformed Data Experts/Destruction Working Group can discuss destruction procedures.
18. New Proposals: Sept. 22, 1983, Nitze introduces new US proposals for limits on land-based LRINF aircraft, US LRINF missile levels in Europe, and P-II/GLCM mix at reduced levels. Negative: October 5, 1983, Kvitsinskiy affirms Andropov's Sept. 29 statement as authoritative and says that US proposals are neither a basis for productive work nor a solution to the problem as a whole.
19. New Meeting Formats: Sept. 27, 1983 Nitze suggests less formal Heads of Delegation or limited attendance plenaries to complement existing procedures. Non-committal: Sept. 29, 1983 Kvitsinskiy resists idea. Work schedule could be intensified, but negotiating record requires official statements.

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US INITIATIVES IN START

US Initiative

1. Exchange of Data on Current Forces: October 19, 1982, Rowny tabled data on US forces and urged Soviets to reciprocate.
2. Working Group: December 2, 1982, Rowny proposes three working groups to deal with CBMs, Definitions, and Exchange of Data.
3. Request for Specific Information: US has repeatedly asked USSR for their specific proposed numerical limits on total "nuclear charges" and MIRVed SNDVs.
4. US Basic Elements: March 1 1983, US tabled Basic Elements to counter Soviet claims that US proposal was not comprehensive. March 3, Rowny suggests working group to address this text and Soviet Basic Principles document.
5. CBMs: March 8, 1983, US tabled draft CBMs agreement, and indicated areas of mutual concern; offered to set aside format and discuss merits.
6. Limit on Deployed Ballistic Missiles: June 23, 1983, US indicated that it was relaxing the 850 limit. We left the number blank, telling the Soviets it was negotiable.

Soviet Response

Negative: November 2, 1982, Karpov responds that exchange on existing balance is unnecessary and data exchange for new agreement is premature.

Negative: February 2, 1983, Karpov said it was premature prior to agreement on the basics.

Incomplete: They provided figures for MIRV aggregates in Round IV, but state that their exact overall weapons limit would depend upon resolution of other issues.

Negative: March 3, 1983, Karpov stated that working groups are instruments of negotiating teams and were doomed to stand still unless there was consensus first.

Negative: March 8, 1983, Soviet side believes CBMs should be considered in overall START agreement. Soviets tabled draft Treaty article on CBMs.

Feigned indifference: June 28, 1983, Soviets said step was taken only to accommodate Midgetman, not to move talks forward. In any event, they said missiles and bombers should be aggregated, not kept separate.

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7. Draft Treaty: July 7, 1983, US tabled draft Treaty.

Mixed: July 12, 1983, Soviets said it was worthwhile procedurally to have concrete proposals on table, but argued that US draft did not change unacceptable nature of US position.

8. Combine Phases: July 7, 1983, US draft called for a single-phase agreement instead of original two-phase approach, thus permitting ALCMS to be limited from the outset.

Feigned indifference: July 6, 1983, Karpov said privately that it was a positive step, but Soviets maintain original US proposal was unrealistic and a non-starter.

9. Limit on ALCM Loading: July 12, 1983, US proposed a maximum of 20 ALCMs on any heavy bomber (compared to average loading limit of 28 in SALT II).

Cool: July 12, 1983, Soviets state that 20 was lower than 28, US still permitted 8,000 ALCMs. Also, ALCMs (and other bomber weapons) should be aggregated with missile warheads. In post-plenary, Karpov proposed a limit of 16 ALCMs per bomber.

10. Throw-Weight Flexibility: July 21, 1983, US offered to withdraw its indirect limits on throw-weight (210/110/2,500) if the Soviets preferred to adopt a direct limit at a mutually-agreed level (implying it could be higher than the current US level). We said we would consider any effective means of reducing throw-weight proposed by the Soviets. To underline our flexibility, we left the provision on throw-weight blank in the US draft Treaty.

Negative: July 19, 1983, Soviets continued to argue that throw-weight was not an important measure of strategic capability and that US proposals were designed to achieve the restructuring and emasculation of Soviet forces. They professed to see nothing significant in our willingness to deal with throw-weight in a variety of ways.

11. CBM Working Group: July 21 1983, US proposed a mandate for a CBM Working Group that left open whether agreed CBMs would be incorporated into a START Treaty or dealt with in a separate agreement.

Uncertain: August 2, 1983, While Soviets hinted that they were ready to set up a CBM Working Group, they did not agree to the neutral mandate we proposed.

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12. Build-Down: In Round V, US proposes: a mutual, guaranteed build-down of ballistic missile warheads by either 5% a year or reductions linked to modernization using variable ratios, depending upon which is greater; concurrent build-down of bombers; additional limits on ALCMs; negotiating trade-offs between US advantages in bomber forces and Soviet advantages in ballistic missile forces; establishment of a build-down working group.

Reserves judgment: Soviets await more details. Initial private reaction on October 12, 1983, is that build-down is nothing new -- a repackaging of US proposal.

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